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[In essays first published earlier this year in mainstream Australian media 
to considerable fanfare, Bagaric and Clarke, two Australian academics, 
develop a modest proposal for the justification of torture under excep-
tional circumstances. This essay rebuts the proposal and defends the abso-
lute prohibition against torture. Their attempt to abstract torture from the 
social context – including the “war on terror” – in which the question of 
government sanctioned torture is now being raised, is condemned as in-
genuous. A rhetorical analysis further demonstrates that the authors them-
selves do not believe their argument is either hypothetical or limited. 
Furthermore, when the actual “defence of torture” is examined, it is 
shown to be illogical, incoherent, and lacking any sophisticated under-
standing of the nature, purpose, or effects of torture. This is not the first 
time that half-baked reasoning and careless analogies have been devel-
oped in order to defend the indefensible. Drawing on Voltaire and Jona-
than Swift as well as Guantanamo Bay, this essay puts an important social 
issue into its immediate and its larger historical context.] 
 
 
I TORTURE IN THEORY 
François Marie Arouet was born in 1694 when the Old Regime – the iron fist of 
Louis XIV in the velvet glove of Versailles – seemed utterly impervious to change. 
Yet by the time of Arouet’s death in 1778, the Enlightenment had wrought such a 
destabilizing effect upon the Regime that it had a scant ten years left to run. Writing 
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under the name Voltaire,1 Arouet, playwright, essayist, and critic, was an over-
whelmingly important figure in the development of modern Western ideas about 
government and justice. Above all, he was a relentless fighter against cruelty and 
superstition. I doubt many would disagree with me when I say that we still have 
need of such fighters. But sometimes we find the advocates of cruelty and supersti-
tion in surprising places. 
 
Voltaire’s mantra throughout his long life, his battle cry against the enemies of 
Enlightenment, was the phrase “Écrasez l’infâme”.2  “Wipe out this infamy – just 
erase it entirely”. But what was so infamous as to demand utter obliteration?  On 
one level, the Catholic church of his day; on another, the whole system of absolute 
government that held France, and most of Europe, in thrall. What they had in com-
mon was this: a power that was entirely unaccountable, entirely unlimited, and 
which instilled a climate of fear through calculated dosages of cruelty. 
 
Voltaire had in mind in particular government practices of torture, both private and 
public, which were common in France. This barbarism sickened him and he knew 
that, father of the Age of Reason though he was, there was no reasoning with or 
controlling it. We cannot argue about such cruelty for that is already to dignify it as 
reasonable. We can only commit ourselves to destroying it. Écrasez l’infâme. 
 
One of the cases that most profoundly disturbed Voltaire was the death of Damiens. 
Convicted of attempting to assassinate Louis XV, he was shockingly tortured and 
executed over several hours in the main square of Paris town hall. Michel Foucault 
wrote at length about this gruesome event, and used it as emblematic of the medie-
val world.3  Under the ancien régime, the power of the State was absolute, exer-
cised through public spectacles and private terrors designed to establish the total 
control of the State and the total subjection that awaited those who resisted it. 
Torture, like the great castles and glorious processions of the monarchy, was a way 
of demonstrating that spectacular power.  
 
Antiquity had been a civilization of spectacle. “To render ac-
cessible to a multitude of men the inspection of a small number 
of objects”: this was the problem to which the architecture of 
temples, theatres and circuses responded. With spectacle, there 
was a predominance of public life, the intensity of festivals, 
sensual proximity. In these rituals in which blood flowed, soci-
ety found new vigour and formed for a moment a single great 
body.4
1  THEODORE BESTERMAN, VOLTAIRE (1969), ALFRED OWEN ALDRIDGE, VOLTAIRE AND THE CENTURY 
OF LIGHT (1975). See also ROGER PEARSON, VOLTAIRE ALMIGHTY: A LIFE IN THE PURSUIT OF 
FREEDOM (forthcoming). 
2  JIM HERRICK, VOLTAIRE: ECRASEZ L’INFAME (1985).  VOLTAIRE, THE PORTABLE VOLTAIRE (Ben Ray 
Redman ed., 1949). 
3  MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNÍSH (Alan Sheridan, trans., 1995). 
4  Id. at 216-7. 
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Violence, says Foucault, above all attacks the State and its right to the exclusive 
legitimate use of it. The public execution performs the re-appropriation of that 
violence by the State, and makes the victim an agent of the complete re-
establishment of the power of sovereignty. 5  The very bodies of the tortured, such 
as Damiens, became mere puppets forcibly made to act a part in this pageant play of 
complete authority. The reduction of a person to a body and a body to the puppet of 
another´s will, as much as pain, defines torture. Torture and execution “did not re-
establish justice; it re-activated power”.6  Its point, ultimately, was not to exact 
retribution or extract information, but to show us all just who was boss. 
 
Yet ironically, as the case of Voltaire demonstrates, the very brutality of torture 
operates against this purpose. Many people became so horrified by events like the  
death of Damiens and by institutions like the lettres des cachets, which entitled the 
French State to lock their opponents up indefinitely, without trial, and without 
explanation, that torture and arbitrary punishment became imbued with a wholly 
different set of meanings than that intended by the State. It came to show not the 
power of the State, but its insecurity; to suggest not the divinity of the sovereign but 
his injustice; to instil not a kind of passivity and submission in the population but 
on the contrary to generate activity and resistance. These provocations exploded 
into life at the end of the eighteenth century, wiping out not just the infamous 
practices themselves but the regime that had become synonymous with them.  
 
Now Foucault argues that since the Enlightenment power is exercised in quite 
different ways: not by the punishment of bodies but through the disciplining of 
minds; not through dramatic acts that destroy us absolutely but through tiny daily 
pressures that encourage us to conform; not in a public square and periodically, but 
every day in homes, schools, factories, armies, hospitals. The end of torture as a 
State institution was coupled by the rise of other institutions, less violent and more 
subtly committed to moulding “docile bodies”. 
 
But perhaps we have written off the ancien régime too quickly. Professor Mirko 
Bagaric and Julie Clarke, writing from the comfort of Deakin University School of 
Law, have attracted widespread media attention by arguing that torture is a “per-
missible” and “moral” action in certain circumstances. 7  Within days, Peter Faris, 
one-time head of the now defunct National Crime Authority, was reported as sup-
porting the “call”.8  Government sanctioned torture is apparently back on the 
agenda.  
 
5  Id. at 48-49. 
6  Id. at 49. 
7  Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke, The Yes Case Can Outweigh The No, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 
17 2005; Mirko Bagaric, A Case for Torture, The Age, May 17, 2005.  See also Mirko Bagaric & Julie 
Clarke, Not Enough Official Torture in the World? The Circumstances in Which Torture Is Morally 
Justifiable, 39 UNIVERSITY S.F.L. REV. (2005).  My analysis is principally derived from the opinion 
pieces which were given considerable publicity in the Australian media and which convey their argu-
ment in concise terms. 
8  Torture Acceptable, Says Former NCA Chief, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 22, 2005. 
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This issue is by no means hypothetical. We are familiar with the dismal story of 
Abu Ghraib.9  But it was by no means an isolated instance. In pursuit of the so-
called “global war against terrorism”, the United States has not only been involved 
in cases of torture themselves, but has routinely sent – the term used is “rendered” - 
suspects to third countries in order that they might be tortured there. 10 So too 
rumours of the kind of practices and calculated cruelties that take place at Guan-
tanamo Bay have surfaced this year with worrying regularity. 
 
Above all, the United States Government has over the past several years clearly 
indicated its desire to claim an absolute sovereignty befitting the Sun King. The 
Bush Administration insists on its right to act as it sees fit in the “war on terror”, 
including by the use of torture and unconstrained by either domestic or international 
law. The Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on 
Terrorism, authorized by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, argues that the Presi-
dent’s “ultimate authority” in a time of self-proclaimed and self-defined war is not 
inhibited by any laws including United States statutes against torture. Consequently 
“the prohibition against torture must be construed as inapplicable to interrogations 
undertaken pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief Authority”.11 Alberto Gonzales, at 
the time Legal Counsel to the White House, is on record as advising that the “new 
paradigm” of counter-terrorism “renders obsolete Geneva [Convention]’s strict 
limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its provi-
sions”.12  For his sins, Alberto Gonzales was appointed United States Attorney 
General in the second Bush administration. A legal black hole has been created in 
two ways. On the one hand, an untrammelled sovereignty is now claimed in inter-
rogating terror suspects. On the other, the United States President has himself 
declared that the detainees at Guantanamo and elsewhere (over 70,000 people at 
last count) fall into no recognizable international category and are therefore uncov-
ered by any international law.13  In the vacuum caused by the infinity of sover-
eignty and the nullity of its targets, anything is now possible. 
 
Trained lawyers that they are, Bagaric and Clarke ignore this social context. They 
studiously protect themselves against allegations of their complicity in these trends. 
9  Seymour M. Hersh, Torture at Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004; MARK DANNER, 
TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004). 
10  John Barry, Michael Hirsh and Michael Isikoff, The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK INTERNATIONAL, 
May 24, 2004; Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005. See also US 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL 
WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY AND OPERATIONAL 
CONSIDERATIONS, Mar. 6, 2003; OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
MEMORANDUM FOR ALBERTO R. GONZALEZ, COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, AND WILLIAM J. HAYNES II 
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, RE: APPLICATION OF TREATIES AND LAWS TO 
AL QAEDA AND TALIBAN DETAINEES, Jan. 22, 2002. And see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, 
GUANTANAMO AND BEYOND: THE CONTINUING PURSUIT OF UNCHECKED EXECUTIVE POWER (REPORT 
ON THE UNITED STATES) (<www.amnesty.org>, 2005). 
11  US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 10, at 20-21.  See 18 USC § 2340A. 
12 ALBERTO GONZALES, MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT: DECISION RE APPLICATION OF THE 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS ON PRISONERS OF WAR, Jan. 25, 2002. 
13  US WHITE HOUSE, MEMORANDUM: HUMANE TREATMENT OF AL QAEDA AND TALIBAN DETAINEES, 
Feb. 7, 2002.   
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Torture, they say, is only justifiable where “torturing a wrongdoer” “is the only 
means, due to the immediacy of the situation, to save the life of an innocent per-
son”. “Recent high-profile incidents of torture, apparently undertaken as punitive 
measures or in a bid to acquire information where there was no evidence of an 
immediate risk to the life of an innocent person, were reprehensible”. Well isn´t that 
nice to know. Moreover, the authors even concede that there may be no such real-
life situations at all. So the question is presented as a harmless thought experiment 
designed to help us interrogate, and indeed to think more carefully about, our moral 
instincts. The effort taken to present their argument as theoretical rather than 
grounded in a specific event; and concomitantly as reasoned, rather than grounded 
in an emotional response, is central to the defensive strategy that underscores their 
analysis.  
 
This attempt to escape responsibility for their words is complete nonsense. Is there 
a single victim of torture anywhere in the world who will be relieved to learn that 
the head of Deakin University Law School has at last injected a bit of sanity and 
balance into a terribly overwrought “debate”?  Let us be clear about this: the only 
reason Bagaric and Clarke’s article was worth publishing – in the University of San 
Francisco Law Review, and certainly on the opinion pages of The Age and the 
Sydney Morning Herald -- is because their subject is topical and relevant. Despite 
all their protestations to the contrary, their argument matters because, no matter 
how much they attempt to distance themselves from it, there is a real social context 
in which they have intervened. Can they seriously deny that their argument will be 
seized upon by those who wish to justify or practice torture around the world?  
Bagaric and Clarke refer to a hypothetical case in which the extraction of informa-
tion from a suspect must be accomplished urgently to avoid the execution of a 
hostage; Peter Faris refers to the imminent explosion of a bomb. The very same 
hypotheticals were used by Attorney General Gonzales to justify discarding the 
Geneva Convention. “The nature of the new war places a high premium on other 
factors, such as the ability to quickly obtain information from captured terrorists 
and their sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities against … civilians”.14  Yet as 
we know, this “torture memo” encouraged the very practices that Bagaric and 
Clarke themselves judge “reprehensible”. These practices include not only Abu 
Ghraib,15 but a wide range of interrogation techniques through which, according to 
Amnesty International’s most recent report, the US government is even now engag-
ing in torture dressed up in bureaucratic newspeak “in pursuit of unchecked execu-
tive power”.16
  
The authors dismiss this as a “slippery slope” argument. But the use made of argu-
ments like those of Bagaric and Clarke to justify ever-expanding practices of torture 
is not hypothetical but a demonstrable fact, engineered, according to US govern-
ment sources, as part of “a calculated effort to create an atmosphere of legal ambi-
14  GONZALES, supra note 12. 
15 Hersh, supra note 9; DANNER, supra note 9. 
16  AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 10. 
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guity”.17  These Australian academics are seriously implicated in the creation of 
that atmosphere: that too is not just my fear or my opinion, but a fact. Just as we 
cannot understand what Voltaire meant by infâme without looking at the events to 
which he was responding, the context in which an argument is made must be read 
as part of its meaning. This is not a complex point. One is responsible not only for 
one’s words but also for their necessary and predictable effects. 
 
Neither do the authors themselves sincerely believe that the argument they make is 
either limited or purely hypothetical. They attack the “misguided”, “alarmist”, 
“reflexive”, “absolutist” and “short-sighted” “moral indecency” of our belief that 
torture is always wrong. Poor Voltaire. He has been accused of many things, but 
rarely all at once. Whatever else we may say of Bagaric and Clarke, their argument 
is rich in emotion and rhetoric. True enough, they say that their defence of torture is 
so cautiously phrased that “a real-life situation where torture is justifiable [might] 
not eventuate”. But in the very next paragraph they conclude: ”the argument in 
favour of torture in limited circumstances needs to be made because it will encour-
age the community to think more carefully about moral judgments we collectively 
hold that are the cause of an enormous amount of suffering in the world”. I wonder 
what hasty moral judgments they have in mind as being responsible for “enormous 
injustice and suffering”? The sole example they provide is our crazy, woolly-
headed prohibition of torture. So this is what their argument must mean: the prohi-
bition against torture is doing our society enormous harm not only in some hypo-
thetical thought-world, but right now. 
 
Even if we take Bagaric and Clarke’s very modest proposal for torture at face value, 
it is logically inseparable from the real-world practices they disavow. Torture by its 
very nature deals with uncertainty; ignorance is the problem that it claims to solve 
through the exercise of violence. Yet torture produces such exceptionally unreliable 
information that it is generally thought to be useless.18  All Western legal systems 
acknowledge this by excluding, because of its inherent unreliability, evidence and 
confessions obtained through torture.19  But the authors do not once address their 
assumption that torture produces enough reliable information, enough of the time, 
to justify it. The central reason that Australian suspect Mamdouh Habib was re-
cently released from US custody is that he had been tortured, and therefore any 
confession he had made was legally inadmissible in any court.20  Having been 
tortured, Habib could never be put on trial. Bagaric and Clarke provide no evidence 
as to why we should think that torture will produce good evidence. On the contrary, 
under current law, it produces no evidence at all. 
 
Now let us look at the problem of ignorance and uncertainty from the torturer’s 
point of view. A licensed torturer cannot know that a supposed terrorist (for exam-
ple) is the only way to locate a bomb; or that there is a bomb; or that he will tell the 
17  Barry, Hirsch & Isikoff, supra note 11. 
18  For an historical understanding, see PAGE DU BOIS, TORTURE AND TRUTH (1991). 
19  See for example UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE, Article 15. 
20  CBS NEWS, Jan. 11, 2005; SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 11, 2005. 
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truth; or even that he is a terrorist. The torturer suspects these things or rather he 
says he suspects these things, and of course he has every reason to say he suspects 
these things, because that is what justifies his actions. It is human nature to see the 
confused and ambiguous world in the way that is most convenient to us. Suppose 
our supposed terrorist denies knowing anything. Do we let him go… or torture him 
some more?  When exactly do we stop?  When exactly do we believe what the 
victim is telling us when the justification of torture is precisely that we only believe 
them when they tell us what we want to know, without already knowing it?  If I 
have not put this point clearly it is because I can’t. There is a paradox here which 
must lead to the kind of grey areas or “slippery slope” that Bagaric and Clarke 
attempt unsuccessfully to exclude. Given criteria under which torture is presumed 
acceptable, such as that which Bagaric and Clarke offer, the pressure on someone in 
a volatile and violent situation to see his enemy in a way that will justify torture is 
irresistible. The authors concede that their modest proposal may not lead to torture 
that saves a life. But they don´t tell you the logical corollary: it will lead to torture, 
and therefore by their own reasoning it will lead to torture that does not save a life. 
Voltaire said, “doubt is not a pleasant condition, but certainty is an absurd one”. He 
was not wrong. 
 
II TORTURE IN PRACTICE 
Bagaric and Clarke therefore cannot avoid considering the modern world, where 
torture is not so uncommon. In the real world, it is duplicitous to describe torture, as 
Bagaric and Clarke do, as “inflicting a relatively small level of harm on a wrong-
doer”. This must be some kind of joke. In the first place, there seems to be a real 
lack of understanding as to how the physical aspects of torture work. How effective 
would a regulated, prescribed, and “relatively small” dose of torture be? Torture is 
not like paying a parking fine. The terror and the threat of torture does not come 
only from the pain by itself. Many of us can tolerate a finite dose of pain, even if it 
is severe: ask a woman what childbirth is like.21  There is surely no reason to think 
that highly motivated terrorists would find the suffering of a specific “level of 
harm” impossible to bear. The power of torture, in most instances, comes instead 
from the promise that the torturer makes that the pain will not stop unless you talk. 
It is a logical contradiction to imagine that torture can be regulated, as Bagaric and 
Clarke seem to imagine, because it is part of its essence as torture that the victim is 
beyond protection and that resistance is futile. In addition, it is fundamental to its 
psychology that the torturer is the sole arbitrator of life and death.22  The whole 
power of torture comes from the absolute reduction of one party to pure power and 
the other to pure powerlessness. In short, and I believe this is a central point that the 
authors have not understood, torture gets people to talk (not, of course, to tell the 
truth, but certainly to talk) if and only if the torturer is sovereign. A torturer-cum-
bureaucrat is a contradiction in terms. 
21 See ERIC CASSELL, PAIN AND SUFFERING (1993); ERIC CASSELL, THE NATURE OF SUFFERING AND 
THE GOALS OF MEDICINE (1991). 
22  ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD (1987). 
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It is appalling that these lawyers – Faris too minimizes torture as “pulling out a 
fingernail” – trivialize the very practice they advocate. Perhaps Bagaric and Clarke 
have read nothing about the nature of pain, memory, and fear.23  Perhaps they have 
not read a single thing about the experience of torture and its implications on those 
who suffer it and those around them. 24  Perhaps they just have no imagination. 
They do not appear to understand that torture is not simply pain. It is the experience 
of absolute powerlessness that reduces the victim, in their own eyes as well as their 
torturer´s, to an animal, a body without will or dignity of any kind. It is the destruc-
tion of identity. Torture is rape just as rape is torture. It is not something to shrug 
off or even, most of the time, to get over.  
 
Neither can we limit our analysis to a single tortured individual. In the world we 
live in and in which Bagaric and Clarke’s argument actually matters, torture is 
never about the emergency rescue of an innocent life. It is used to extract a wide 
range of information about the functioning of many outlaw groups. But because of 
the inherent unreliability of its evidence, this is not its main purpose. Torture is used 
to punish and humiliate dissidents, terrorists, and members of ethnic minorities. It is 
used as a calibrated dose of cruelty through which to terrorize whole communi-
ties.25  Just like Damiens, torture is a demonstration of what the State can do to you 
and what it can get you to do. The effect is to create a generalized fear about the 
infinite and random power of the State to destroy lives, and an intense sense of 
vulnerability in victim populations.  
 
To try and talk about torture as an act practiced on isolated individuals without 
considering its effects on the families and societies around them, who all live under 
its constant and unavoidable shadow, is either foolish or duplicitous. Torture does 
not just affect individuals. It affects whole societies: it terrorizes them and ulti-
mately, as we saw in Voltaire’s Europe, the powerlessness it communicates shifts 
from passivity to rage. The turning point in the lives of many Al Qaeda operatives 
was their imprisonment and torture in Egyptian, Syrian, and other middle eastern 
prisons: this same Egypt to which the United States still “renders” suspects in order 
to soften them up.26 Torture produces terrorists: whole families and villages of 
them. That too is a necessary implication of even the apologists’ pale fiction of 
torture. It is one reason that there is a growing suspicion that the prisoners in Guan-
tanamo Bay - according to the Secretary General of Amnesty International, part of 
the “gulag of our times”27 - may never be released. How can they be? Bystanders or 
warriors, they are much greater risks to us now.  
 
23  Id.  
24  They might start with PETER ELSASS, TREATING VICTIMS OF TORTURE AND VIOLENCE (1997). 
25  See for example, JOHN CONROY, UNSPEAKABLE ACTS, ORDINARY PEOPLE (2001). 
26  Mayer, supra note 10.  See also Human Rights Watch Reports for 2005, particularly in relation to 
Egypt, and Stephen Grey, America’s Gulag, THE NEW STATESMAN, May 17, 2004. 
27  NEW YORK TIMES, May 26, 2005. 
 2005  Another Modest Proposal 648 
 
                                                          
To these real and necessary consequences, which our society would have to under-
stand, accept, and somehow combat if we were ever to accept Bagaric and Clarke’s 
argument, the authors have paid no attention at all. 
 
III DEFENDING IT 
I have argued, first logically and then practically, that it is impossible to accept this 
modest proposal for torture as being confined to its own strict terms. We are inevi-
tably led to imagine the actual physical and social consequences of such a principle. 
But for the sake of argument let us look a little closer at the ways in which Bagaric 
and Clarke attempt to defend an entitlement to torture.28  According to Bagaric and 
Clarke, the illegality of torture has only served, by its unnecessary absolutism, to 
drive it “beneath the radar screen of accountability”; legalization might “reduce the 
instances of it”. It is difficult to see why this assertion would be true. Our societies 
are not without experience of legal torture. Was there less of it then?  Moreover, the 
emotions that lead to real torture – fear, crisis, hatred – will not be reduced by 
legality. In what sense will “accountability” make a difference to these practices 
except to provide a helpful framework in which they can be organized, carried out 
and justified? 
 
The radar argument sounds initially plausible: it is certainly true that illegality does 
not always work and sometimes only serves to make matters worse. 29 This is 
particularly the case, for example, in relation to victimless crimes. But torture is 
hardly victimless. Let us look a little closer to see how the analogy falls down. With 
drug use or prostitution, the argument is that legalization will clean up the secretive 
conditions under which they operate and therefore not lessen their incidence but 
ameliorate their effects. In general, the scholars of what is called “harm minimiza-
tion” do not dare to contend that a more open approach to drugs will lead to less 
use; only that it will dramatically improve the social and health conditions of us-
ers.30  But it is not the conditions under which torture is practiced that are the prob-
lem. Danger and pain are not a by-product of torture (as they are, for example, to a 
considerable degree a by-product of the current regime of drug prohibition); they 
are intrinsic to it. Were torture done in public, were it supervised by a qualified 
medical practitioner in a hygienic environment, were it made respectable – tell me, 
would any of this make torture better?  Once again Voltaire comes to mind: “If we 
believe absurdities, we shall commit atrocities”. 
 
The centre-piece of Bagaric and Clarke’s defence offers as obvious example of 
begging the question as I have seen. They argue by analogy to “the right of self-
28  I leave aside their criticism of the “slippery slope” argument which I have referred to above. 
29  I have written about this at considerable length elsewhere: see DESMOND MANDERSON, FROM MR SIN 
TO MR BIG: A HISTORY OF AUSTRALIAN DRUG LAWS (1993). 
30  ALEX WODAK & TIM MOORE, MODERNISING AUSTRALIA’S DRUG POLICY (2001); ALEX WODAK & 
RON OWENS, DRUG PROHIBITION: A CALL FOR CHANGE (1996); DRUG USE IN AUSTRALIA: A HARM 
MINIMIZATION APPROACH (Margaret Hamilton et. al, eds., 1998); HARM REDUCTION: A NEW DIRECTION 
FOR DRUG POLICIES AND PROGRAMS  (Patricia Erikson et. al, eds., 1997).  
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defence, which of course extends to the defence of another”. Let us leave aside that 
rather hasty “of course” which is far from evident. Just as we are entitled to respond 
with violence to a murderous attack, they say, we are entitled to protect others; if 
the only way to protect them is by torturing somebody for information, then torture 
must be legitimate too. But the analogy falls down in at least three ways. First, the 
principle of self-defence recognizes a reality: when it´s “him or me” a law that said 
I could not respond to an attacker would be simply unenforceable.31 Here the vio-
lence of torture is a choice deliberately made and carried out, and not purely re-
sponsive. 
 
Secondly, their analogy assumes the only point it needs to prove. One can legally 
defend oneself; one can even kill an attacker if necessary; but what legal system has 
ever authorized a case of torture “in self-defence”?  Why do the authors assume that 
self-defence, which is strictly limited to a direct, minimal and reasonable response 
to threat,32 is in any way equivalent to torture, which is by its very nature indirect 
and maximal?  In fact, our societies have, at least since the Enlightenment, feared 
pain more than death,33 believed that human dignity requires absolute protection 
under all circumstances, and thought torture a more serious act than execution. 
Legal systems throughout the world outlawed torture long, long before capital 
punishment. In the United States, torture has always been contrary to the 8th 
Amendment; it is the paradigmatic example of “cruel and unusual punishment”.34 
Yet the death penalty continues to be applied – as painlessly as possible.35  So 
clearly in the United States, and in fact throughout the world, it is generally consid-
ered worse to torture than to kill. Bagaric and Clarke think it obvious that if we can 
kill someone in self-defence, therefore it must be all right to torture them. But this 
is precisely what the absolute prohibition of torture rejects. It is not that Bagaric and 
Clarke could not make an argument against this orthodoxy. But they do not attempt 
to do so. They simply assert their position as self-evident. It is nothing of the kind. 
 
There is a third, and to my mind even more important, way in which the analogy 
between self-defence and torture fails. Self-defence is about individual action, 
torture is about government action: the limits we believe ought to apply to each are 
not necessarily the same. There is a profound difference between individual acts of 
cruelty and a system of government-regulated torture. There is a difference between 
kidnapping and a government policy of taking Aboriginal children from their fami-
lies.36  There is a difference between murder – even mass murder – and genocide.37  
The difference is the government sanction and the government power that stands 
31  See Lon Fuller, The Case of the Spelunkian Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949). 
32  VIRO V. THE QUEEN, (1978) 141 CLR 88; ZECEVIC V. DPP (VICTORIA), F.C. 87/027 (UNREPORTED 
HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA, 1987). 
33  See PHILIPPE ARIÈS, THE HOUR OF OUR DEATH (1981). 
34  CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT VIII (US); see Wilkerson v. Utah (1878) 99 US 130 (US). 
35  Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 US 153 (US). 
36  See Kruger v. Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1; HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, BRINGING THEM HOME: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INQUIRY INTO THE SEPARATION OF 
ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER CHILDREN FROM THEIR FAMILIES (Chair: Sir Ronald 
Wilson, 1997). 
37  GEORGE ANDREOPOULOS, GENOCIDE: CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS (1994). 
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behind it in each case. 38  Government action – law – carries a mark of legitimacy 
with it. Self-defence which leads to murder, or even revenge, might elicit our sym-
pathy. But it is not the same thing as a government program which establishes, 
institutionalizes, organizes, and legitimizes torture. No matter how limited, torture 
is thereby made right in a way that no act of personal self-defence ever makes 
murder right. It seems a little surprising that one has to say this to members of a 
faculty of law. The standards we expect of governments are different from the 
behaviour we anticipate from individuals. We hold governments to higher standards 
for a reason. 
 
So too, the reach and mechanisms of government power make torture a weapon 
from which no member of the community will feel immune. If the State could 
torture any one of us – they probably wouldn’t, but they could – what sort of a 
society would we live in?  Now Bagaric and Clarke attempt to avoid this problem 
by implying that torture would only effect the very few that in some sense deserved 
it. They insist that it is “verging on moral indecency” “to favour the interests of 
wrongdoers over those of the innocent”. The word “wrongdoer” is used throughout 
their argument. Although it makes us feel morally superior to the victim of torture, 
it is another question-begging term, since the authors again simply assume that we 
can happily identify the wrongdoers. Perhaps they are only associates of terrorists, 
or family members; and in any case any torture that takes place will very probably 
precede a trial that might establish whether or not they are innocent. After all, as 
both Bagaric and Clarke along with Gonzales insist, the whole point of the argu-
ment in favour of torture is our need “to quickly obtain information from captured 
terrorists and their sponsors”.39 So much for the rule of law: another suspicion of 
‘wrongdoing’ has been miraculously converted into a certainty. 
 
In the real world, which again I am sorry to have to bring up, there are many rea-
sons why we might all live in fear of a government which had reserved to itself 
some kind of right to torture suspects. Perhaps it might just be a case of mistaken 
identity, or maybe you happened to be born with a foreign sounding name, or 
maybe you look suspicious or are the wrong colour, or come from a country with a 
violent history, or are otherwise associated with the wrong people, or perhaps you 
were just known for holding unpopular opinions at one time or other. How much 
torture might it take to clear your name?  In the face of all these nagging fears, 
would even a Professor at a law school feel truly safe? And what effect would that 
endemic, nagging fear have on all our lives and our relationship to the State? Peter 
Faris, former head of the National Crime Authority, says it would be all right “to 
pull out a fingernail of a terrorist in order to save a couple of million lives”. But the 
government legitimization of torture, whatever the reason, would ultimately serve 
only to cripple a few million lives. 
 
38  An argument which, in relation to genocide, I have developed further in Desmond Manderson, 
Apocryphal Jurisprudence, 26 AUSTRALIAN J.L.P. 27 (2001). 
39  GONZALES, supra note 12.  
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IV OPPOSING IT 
The apologists cannot see the difference between self-defence and torture because 
they are concerned only about outcomes and never about means. For Bagaric and 
Clarke, it is simply a calculation: one tortured terrorist versus an innocent life or 
many. Their argument is a rather crude example of utilitarianism,40 except for the 
fact that they have not seriously attempted to take into account the actual costs and 
benefits of the balancing act they propose. In their version of the utilitarian calcu-
lus, the benefits are a sheer fantasy and the costs are completely ignored. 
 
Against utilitarianism, there is not much to say that has not been said many times 
before. Ethics means that there are some things you do not do even though it would 
advantage you (or the whole society) to do them. Ethics means that we impose 
limits on our actions which cannot be reduced to a calculation about winners and 
losers. Slavery, for example, would not be less wrong if more people gained from it 
than lost. It would not be less wrong even if we only enslaved “wrongdoers”. The 
wrong is intrinsic and irredeemable. It is not negotiable in terms of costs and bene-
fits.41
 
So too, human rights protect not just good people but all people, and not just some 
of the time but all of the time: they are not to be weighed up, or sacrificed. It is in 
the nature of a human right that it is incalculable. We might feel that certain people 
have acted in such a way that they no longer deserve to be treated humanely, and if 
society as a whole were to gain by torturing them a little, then we should be allowed 
to do so. But human rights are not something we deserve. They are something that 
protects each of us from abuse by protecting us all of us unconditionally. These 
rights recognize as inviolable the core of our autonomy as human beings, regard-
less of the temptation or the need to violate them. And as partial and problematic as 
this argument undoubtedly is,42 if there is anything at all that we have a right to 
protect against the government and against all of society, it is our bodily integrity, 
indeed our sanity, our very self. That is the absolute right of which torture threatens 
to deprive us. Rather more than a fingernail is at stake. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Torture is wrong under all circumstances, not because it leads to certain bad out-
comes, but for no reason: simply and inherently. This is not a perverse argument. 
40  J. S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM (George Sher, ed., 2001); PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS (2d ed. 
1993). 
41 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF 
PHILOSOPHY (1985). 
42 DOUZINAS, THE END OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2000); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000). 
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Love, for example, is good not because it might lead us to wealth or happiness, but 
for no reason.43  It just is. In fact, to look for reasons, to ask “what is love good 
for”’ or “how does loving someone benefit me”? is a sign of psychopathy. If Baga-
ric and Clarke, and Faris, cannot see the inherent wrong of torture, it is hard to see 
how to communicate with them. But let me suggest two possible approaches in-
tended to communicate what I see as intrinsically true to those who clearly don’t 
see it that way. 
 
The first approach is literary. When Voltaire was a relatively young man, Jonathan 
Swift, author of Gulliver´s Travels, wrote “A Modest Proposal” of his own.44   
What will we do about the poor children of Ireland, he asked, who are such a bur-
den to their parents? 
 
I have been assured by a very knowing American of my ac-
quaintance in London, that a young healthy child well nursed is 
at a year old a most delicious, nourishing, and wholesome food, 
whether stewed, roasted, baked, or boiled; and I make no doubt 
that it will equally serve in a fricassee or a ragout. 
 
There´s a solution to famine for you, and what after all is wrong with it?  If children 
seem too innocent, we could just eat those in the reformatories, wrongdoers each 
and every one. Without a sense of our limits, the calibration of costs and benefits is 
unstoppable: and we shall be led to commit atrocities. It strikes me that the current 
modest proposal for torture makes the same mistakes: slipping seamlessly and 
without argument across fundamental distinctions, attempting to rationalize a re-
pugnant argument, ignoring the social context it echoes and blind to the horrific 
practical implications of the system it envisages. But Swift´s modest proposal was 
satire, while Bagaric and Clarke’s is farce. 
 
The second approach is historical. Both proposals, above all, display that dangerous 
human quality of arrogance which somehow assumes that we can and should weigh 
up a person’s pain or a community’s fear, against a life or lives. It is the econo-
mists’ approach to life and the tyrant’s approach to politics: everything is about 
numbers, and no calculation is too dangerous to be attempted. This offers an easy 
answer to all our problems, but the easy answers are usually wrong. We know all 
about the Western history of State-sanctioned torture, l’amende honorable and the 
Inquisition. It is not a tradition worth reviving. 
 
Finally, our repugnance is not simply the instinctive and “reflex rejection of tor-
ture” that Bagaric and Clarke disparage. A great deal of effort and thought has been 
expended towards making torture as unacceptable as it is today. We have learnt this 
feeling of disgust as a response to torture over time, and it is rather easier to argue 
43 See EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY (trans. Alphonso Lingis, 1969); OTHERWISE THAN 
BEING (trans. Alphonso Lingis, 1981);  DESMOND MANDERSON, PROXIMITY: LEVINAS AND THE SOUL OF 
LAW (forthcoming). 
44  JONATHAN SWIFT, A MODEST PROPOSAL AND OTHER SATIRICAL WORKS 1729 (2002). 
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that the world might benefit from more of it than less. Disgust, like shame, is not a 
pointless emotion. On the contrary, it is an exceptionally powerful way to change 
the behaviour of people and of communities.45  Voltaire would weep to read the 
arguments now being used to justify a new-found tolerance of torture. He saw 
torture and he knew what it looked like. And he also knew that at some point the 
arguments must stop so that the disgust might begin. Écrasez l’infâme. Don´t nego-
tiate: just wipe it out. 
 
 
45 MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME AND THE LAW (2004); JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION (1989). 
